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1. Introduction 
In the last 10 years the reductionism debate has shifted to the idea of reduction as a 
relation not between theories, but between explanations. A reductionist explains a 
system’s phenomenon by the properties and interactions of its components. Through this 
move Sahotra Sarkar attempted to shift attention from a discussion of the logical form of 
scientific theories to questions regarding the interpretation of scientific explanations 
(Sarkar 1998). During this time there has been a spate of publications on what has 
variously been termed 'causal', 'proximal', or 'experimental' biology, including Sahotra 
Sarkar’s Molecular Models of Life, Marcel Weber’s Philosophy of Experimental Biology, 
William Bechtel’s Discovering Cell Mechanisms and Alexander Rosenberg’s Darwinian 
Reductionism (Sarkar 2005; Weber 2005; Bechtel 2006; Rosenberg 2006). Among the 
emergent themes in the recent literature on proximal biology are: 1. Does proximal 
biology discover 'mechanisms' rather than laws or theories? 2. What is the relationship 
between physicalism and antireductionism? 3. How does proximal biology deal with 
levels of organization, complexity and non-trivial emergence? In the light of these and 
other themes this paper discusses to what extent should we expect biological phenomena 
to be reduced to the molecular level. While most philosophers of biology, and arguably 
biologists as well, subscribe to some kind of physicalism they also belief that biological 
phenomena in principle cannot be reduced to physical ones. However, some 
reductionists, notably Alex Rosenberg, have pointed to the alleged paradox, or “untenable 
dualism”, between physicalism and antireductionism (Rosenberg 2006). 
 
Based on some contemporary ideas in foundational physics this paper will first show that 
not only are physicalism and antireductionism compatible but that knowledge of certain 
physical principles - that show remarkable independence from micro laws governing 
smaller particles – must lead to such a move. This section leads away from the 
mainstream multiple realizability argument for non-reductionism to the argument from 
the physical principle of organization and collective behavior. The second section argues 
that this non-reductionism still allows for the legitimate commitment to methodological 
reductionism complementing an explanatory non-reductive strategy. The last section will 
apply the conclusion drawn in the previous sections to interpret the recent move from 
molecular biology to postgenomic biology. It was indeed no paradox that the success of 
reductionist biology ultimately lead to the conviction that a deep understanding of living 
systems needs both the knowledge of the component microproperties and the insights of a 
top-down approach into the system’s macroproperties from systems biology. 
  
2. Antireductionism and Physicalism 
Rosenberg’s demand for a reductionistic biology rests on the metaphysical thesis of 
physicalism and the claim that non-reductionistic explanations are incompatible with 
physicalism. (In contrast to the recent move in philosophy of biology to demand 
biological explanations in terms of mechanisms Rosenberg insists on nomological-
deductive explanations). Physicalism is sometimes interpreted as the ‘causal closure’ or 
‘completeness of physics’ principle, which holds that all physical events are determined 
by the fundamental laws of physics (Bishop 2005), or as the assumption that all worldly 
phenomena are nothing but ‘matter in motion’. I want to contrast this stance towards 
worldly phenomena with ‘matter (not just in motion but) in organization’, a stance taken 
up by some non-reductionist physicalists. There is more to physics than reduction to 
quantum mechanics, relativity theory and an elusive Theory of Everything.  
 
Probably most biologists, often without basic knowledge of physics, believe that physics 
is in itself the most reductionist of sciences. This is by no means true for all physicists. 
The drift away from reductionism is most pronounced among condensed matter and low 
energy physicists who claim that for most worldly phenomena the Standard Model or the 
illusive Theory of Everything would be unable to explain what we deem interesting about 
them. Some argue for a hierarchy of more or less independent Effective Field Theories 
(Castellani 2002). A heterogeneous group of physicists attempt to define general physical 
principles that defy reductionism by their transcendence and independence of 
microscopic laws (Anderson 1972, 2005; Charap 2002; Laughlin and Pines 2000; 
Laughlin 2005; Ellis 2006). It is still the case that “to other kinds of scientists the idea is 
considered dangerous and ludicrous, for it is fundamentally at odds with the reductionist 
beliefs central to much of physics. But the safety that comes from acknowledging only 
the facts one likes is fundamentally incompatible with science” (Laughlin and Pines 
2000, 30). 
 
Who are to enact that the laws governing the behavior of particles are more ultimate than 
the transcendent, emergent laws of the collective they generate, such as the principles of 
organization responsible for emergent behavior? According to the physicist George F. R. 
Ellis true complexity emerges as higher levels of order from, but to a large degree 
independent of, the underlying low-level physics. Order implies higher-level systemic 
organization that has real top-down effects on the behavior of the parts at the lower level. 
Organized matter has unique properties (Ellis 2004). In the same vein the two Nobel 
laureates and Stanford professors of physics Phillip W. Anderson and Robert B. Laughlin 
have both challenged the prevailing reductionist strategy of modern science. While the 
former identifies contingent symmetry breaking features providing new ontologies and 
concludes More is different (Anderson 1972), the latter asserts that laws and theories 
follow from collective behavior, not the other way around. If we try to analyze things too 
closely, we risk not understanding how they work on a macro level. Together with David 
Pines Laughlin claims that “the triumph of the reductionism of the Greeks is a pyrrhic 
victory: We have succeeded in reducing all of ordinary physical behavior to a simple, 
correct Theory of Everything only to discover that it has revealed exactly nothing about 
many things of great importance” (Laughlin and Pines 2000, 28). They point to higher 
organizing principles in nature, e.g. the principle of continuous symmetry breaking, 
localization, protection, and self-organization, that are insensitive to and independent of 
the underlying microscopic laws and often solely determine the generic low-energy 
properties of stable states of matter (‘quantum protectorates’) and their associated 
emergent physical phenomena. “The central task of theoretical physics in our time is no 
longer to write down the ultimate equations but rather to catalogue and understand 
emergent behavior in its many guises, including potentially life itself. We call this physics 
of the next century the study of complex adaptive matter” (Laughlin and Pines 2000). 
 
From this existence of new laws of nature that become operational only at more complex 
levels of organization I deduce that ‘fundamental’ laws governing the behavior of parts 
are necessary but not sufficient to explain systemic phenomena. The latter are conditional 
on the contingent context set by physics, chemistry or biology causing emerging 
principles, together with which they form sufficient conditions for the systemic properties 
we wish to explain. It is important to note that these newly emerging forces don’t 
contradict contemporary physics, a physics consisting of a hierarchy of laws that emerge 
out of complexly organized matter, instead of being ‘nothing but’ a final quantum theory 
of gravity. Only when this truth sinks in will the reductionist camp of the life sciences 
agree to embrace complexity. 
 
3. Two Kinds of Reductionist Strategies 
There are different research foci at work and depending on them a reductionist 
methodology and explanatory strategy may be a poor or the proper choice. One example 
is the focus on genes and genomes in molecular biology not because of their proposed 
(but unsupported) unique ontological status but because of their unique manipulability 
due to their stereo-chemical and digital properties. To deduce from these properties, 
however, the special status of genomes as programs that reductively explain development 
and all bodily functions is not a logical conclusion. A reductionist methodology and even 
explanatory strategy can have its virtues when focusing on computation, engineering, 
simplification and manipulation, but has its vices when trying to extrapolate illegitimately 
from a limited base of knowledge. Reductionism is a central epistemic strategy, and since 
every system can in principle be analyzed through the behavior of its components such a 
strategy is always possible. It is nevertheless unclear, and as I argue rather unlikely, that 
reductionism always delivers the only possible, the most satisfying, or the most complete 
explanation of a phenomenon.  
 
In most definitions or understandings of reductionism the explanatory arrows points 
downward (Weinberg 1987). But is the best and most parsimonious choice in science 
always to explain phenomena by lower physical laws? The reductionist approach tends to 
ignore a crucial feature that enables the emergence of biological complexity out of the 
underlying physical substratum, namely, top-down action in the hierarchy of complexity 
that affects both the context and nature of constituent parts. What occurs is causally 
efficacious contextual emergence of complexity (Bishop 2005; Craver and Bechtel 2006). 
Instead of always choosing the simplest explanation one may want the most complete and 
encompassing one. Jason Scott Robert, for instance, has asked if development should be 
reduced to developmental genetics or molecular biology, or if indeed the latter should 
both be ‘reduced’, or better, integrated into a more complete theory of development. He 
argues convincingly that the genetic explanation does not explain the original problem 
(development) but a sub-problem (the role of genes in development) (Robert 2004).  
 
Rosenberg in his Darwinian Reductionism neglects to discuss the many forms of 
emergence (weak, strong, nontrivial) and the various commitments to reductionism that 
go along with them. The book defines the reductionistic program of molecular biology as 
the belief that all biological phenomena must in principle be fully reducible to the 
scientific laws recognized by physics and chemistry - notwithstanding the contestability 
of the reduction of chemistry (Bishop 2005; Luisi 2002); there is nothing more to 
biological facts than the interaction of macromolecules that bring them about. Here 
Rosenberg implicitly refers to ontological reductionism. At another place we are 
informed that biological explanations need to be “improved, corrected, strengthened, 
made more accurate and adequate, and completed” by molecular biology (Rosenberg 
2006, 4). This statement, however, translates the former into biological practice and 
therefore refers to epistemological reductionism. As not just a matter of practical 
limitations on our ability to carry out reductions but a view about scientific theorizing, it 
includes methodological and explanatory reduction (Feest 2003; Jones 2004). Without 
appreciating the difference between investigative and explanatory strategies one couldn’t 
understand that a biologist may follow molecular research methodologies while at the 
same time seek a full explanation by including non-reductive approaches. Hence her 
explanation would be non-reductionistic while still grounded in molecular biology and 
microscopic physical laws that provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
emergent phenomenon accounted for in the explanation. 
 
Niels Bohr’s and Max Delbrueck’s quest for complementarity and new laws of physics in 
biology, which both held before being lured in by the early successes of molecular 
biology, is an example of such a strategy (Vol'kenshteĭn 1988). Both shared the belief that 
at least some aspects of life are not reducible to physico-chemical terms; mechanistic and 
teleological descriptions should be understood as mutually exclusive yet jointly necessary 
for an exhaustive understanding of life (McKaughan 2005). Phillip Anderson has 
distinguished the legitimate “reductionist hypothesis”, “the ability to reduce everything to 
simple fundamental laws” from the fallacious “constructionist hypothesis”, that argues 
for “the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe” (Anderson 1972, 
393). 
 
4. From investigative reductionism to holist explanations in biology 
“In the 1940's, J. H. Woodger (1948) argued that biologists should only use biological 
facts to explain other biological facts, and that they certainly should not reduce them 
to the concepts of physics and chemistry. (…) But the decoding of the "language of 
life" by Watson and Crick was not achieved by adhering to the various doctrines of 
biological ontological autonomy, nor could it possibly have been. (…) Woodger's 
biology was revolutionized by an exploration of the atomic structure and chemistry of 
the DNA molecule. Indeed, the central concepts of these disciplines (ions in 
chemistry, genes in biology) have their origins in what was once dismissed as 
reductionist science.” (Walsh 1997, 125)  
 
Equating the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA with the “decoding of the 
‘language of life’” or similarly overstated metaphors is a typical ‘argument’ for 
reductionism in biology. Strangely many biologists and non-specialists alike seem 
satisfied with accepting the existence of ‘genes’ as the ultimate explanation of life. How 
can detecting the chemical structure of one macromolecule uncover the ‘secrets of life’ 
when all it does is carrying template capacities for important cellular ingredient? By 
transferring the near mystical powers people had attributed to the placeholder in a 
biological theory to explain the transmission of biological form, termed ‘genes’, to the 
macromolecule DNA and neglecting to provide the molecular mechanisms of the 
emergence of life through the mere existence of DNA. This is no reductionist success 
story but an example of “astrological science” (its not in the stars, its in the genes) 
(Barnes and Dupre Manuscript). To answer how the complexity of life emerges from its 
underlying simplicity, however, is the real challenge of the life sciences of the 21st 
century. These ‘fundamental principles of life’ must go beyond the Darwinian process of 
evolution and the genetic code; DNA just provides sequestered templates from which 
advanced living system build some of life’s building block, and natural selection is itself 
an emergent phenomenon resulting from the origin of non-linear dynamical systems that 
exhibit the central properties of metabolism (the channeling of energy), cellularity 
(individuality through membranes), reproduction and adaptability (production of 
heritable variation). 
 
The extraordinarily successful reductionist approach of present day physics and 
molecular biology is based on the concept of an isolated system. But in the real world all 
parts show high sensitivity to context; hence context matters beside laws and other 
regularities. Even though systems are ultimately constructed out of their components how 
should one think about ‘parts’ without envisioning (their constituent function for) the 
whole system? The system itself produces top-down effects that influence its 
components’ behavior. Craver and Bechtel translate interlevel causes (both bottom-up 
and top-down) into mechanistically mediated effects that are hybrids of causal and 
constitutive relations (Craver and Bechtel 2006). Wholes and parts are constitutive of 
each other. The same macromolecules acting in isolation or in an integrative whole have - 
sometimes radically - different effects due to their recruitment into different networks of 
interacting parts. This difference between molecular and cellular functions of molecules 
creates one of the challenges for reductionist research strategies. The ways in which the 
same molecules function differently in different networks and how they produce 
emergent behavior at the systems level because of the way the system is organized is just 
one phenomenon that the sciences of complexity, postgenomics and systems biology 
attempt to tackle. 
 
The genome sequencing project revealed that humans possess a modular set of ca 21,000 
protein-coding genes from which the body can fashion two orders of magnitude more 
products. And while genomics, proteomics, transcriptomics, metabolomics and other 
~omics are in the process of mapping the complete inventory of living cells, newly 
emerging sciences are left with the lingering question of how to reassemble these 
constituents to form complex living systems (Stotz 2006, submitted). 
 
“For better or worse we are now witnessing a transition from the science of the past, 
so intimately linked to reductionism, to the study of complex adaptive matter, firmly 
based in experiment, with its hope for providing a jumping-off point for new 
discoveries, new concepts, and new wisdom.” (Laughlin and Pines 2000, 30) 
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